

4. SPECIAL PROJECTS AND REPORTS

A. Surface and Maritime Transportation (GAO)

The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) has published a report (GAO-02-775) dated August 2002 and titled *Surface and Maritime Transportation – Developing Strategies for Enhancing Mobility: A National Challenge*. Given the social and economic importance of the surface and maritime transportation systems and to inform the U.S. Congress in its legislative reauthorization deliberations, the report addresses the following issues: (1) the trends over the past 10 years in surface and maritime transportation expenditures made by the public sector; (2) the projected trends in the levels of passenger and freight travel on surface and maritime transportation modes over the next 10 years and the key factors that influence those trends; (3) the key challenges in maintaining and improving mobility; and (4) some key strategies for addressing the challenges.

According to GAO, during the past decade, total public sector spending (in 1999 dollars) increased for public roads and transit, remained constant for waterways, and decreased for rail. Federal expenditures for public roads have substantially increased since the passage of the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21) in 1998 – from \$21.2 billion in 1998 to \$26.9 billion in 2000, an increase of 26.8 percent. Federal spending for transit decreased slightly between 1991 and 1999 and then increased by 21.5 percent from \$4.3 billion in 1999 to \$5.2 billion in 2000. Federal spending stayed constant for waterways and decreased for rail during the period from 1991 to 2000. The state and local share of total public sector expenditures stayed relatively constant during fiscal years 1991 through 1999 for public roads, while modestly increasing for other modes.

Passenger and freight travel are expected to increase over the next 10 years according to U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) projections. Passenger vehicle travel on public roads is expected to grow by 24.7 percent from 2000 to 2010. Passenger travel on transit systems is expected to increase by 17.2 percent over the same period. Amtrak has estimated that intercity passenger rail ridership will increase by 25.9 percent from 2001 to 2010. Preliminary estimates by DOT indicate that tons of freight moved on all surface and maritime modes – truck, rail, and water – are expected to increase by 43 percent from 1998 to 2010, with the largest increase expected to be in the truck sector. The key factors behind increases in passenger travel, and the modes travelers choose, are expected to be population growth, the aging of the population, and rising affluence. For freight movements, economic growth, increasing international trade, and the increasing value of cargo shipped may affect future travel levels and the modes used to move freight. However, several factors in the forecast methodologies limit their ability to capture the effects of changes in travel levels on the surface and maritime transportation systems. In particular, the key assumption underlying most of the national travel projections that GAO obtained is that capacity will increase as levels of travel increase; therefore, the projections are not limited by possible future constraints on capacity such as increasing congestion.

With increasing passenger and freight travel, the surface and maritime transportation systems face a number of challenges that involve ensuring continued mobility while maintaining a balance with other social goals, such as environmental preservation. These challenges include:

(1) preventing congestion from overwhelming the transportation system; (2) ensuring access to transportation for certain underserved populations, including some elderly, poor, and rural populations that have restricted mobility; and (3) addressing the transportation system's negative effects on the environment and communities.

There is no one solution for the mobility challenges facing the nation, and numerous approaches are needed to address these challenges. The wide range of approaches can be clustered into three key strategies that may aid transportation decisionmakers at all levels of government in addressing mobility challenges. These strategies include: (1) focus on the entire surface and maritime transportation system rather than on specific modes or types of travel to achieve desired mobility outcomes; (2) use a full range of tools – such as new construction, corrective and preventive maintenance, rehabilitation, operations and system management, and pricing – to achieve desired mobility outcomes; and (3) provide more options for financing mobility improvements and consider additional sources of revenue.

For further information, contact JayEtta Z. Hecker, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, U.S. General Accounting Office, 441 G Street, NW, Washington, DC 20548, (telephone: (202) 512-2834, electronic mail: heckerj@gao.gov) or refer to the GAO Reports section of GAO's Internet Web Site: <http://www.gao.gov>.

B. Environmentally Sound Dismantling of Ships (UNEP)

The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) has developed, under the auspices of the Conference of Parties to the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, a guidance document titled *Technical Guidelines for the Environmentally Sound Management of the Full and Partial Dismantling of Ships*. The preparation of these technical guidelines was carried out in close collaboration with Basel Convention parties, the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the International Labor Organization (ILO), the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), and environmental non-governmental organizations.

In this document, UNEP/Basel Convention parties state that the dismantling of vessels in many developing countries is often not performed with due regard to accepted environmental, health, and safety standards. These guidelines were prepared with the intention of providing guidance to countries that have established or wish to establish facilities for ship dismantling. The guidelines provide information and recommendations on procedures, processes, and practices that must be implemented to attain environmentally sound management at such facilities. The guidelines also provide advice on monitoring and verification of environmental performance.

For the purpose of the guidelines, “environmentally sound management of hazardous wastes or other wastes” means taking all practicable steps to ensure that hazardous wastes or other wastes are managed in a manner that will protect human health and the environment against the adverse effects that may result from such wastes. “Recycling” means the recovery and reprocessing of waste materials for use in new products. “Reuse” is defined as again using a product following normal use and implies recovery and refurbishment before the product can be reused.

The guidelines do not currently address measures to minimize the hazardous materials aboard a ship prior to it being sent to a ship recycling facility. However, Basel Convention parties believe that such waste minimization guidelines are an important part of addressing the problems associated with ship recycling. The IMO Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) is addressing this and related issues. Further, these guidelines do not deal in depth with the occupational health and safety aspects of ship recycling. The ILO has undertaken an effort to prepare such guidelines. Once developed, the ILO guidance may be incorporated in these guidelines.

The guidelines are applicable to existing ship dismantling facilities as well as to new facilities. Topics addressed include: (1) principles of environmentally sound management of ship dismantling; (2) good practice in environmental control procedures at ship-dismantling facilities; (3) good practice in design, construction, and operation of ship dismantling facilities; (4) achieving environmentally sound management practices; (5) gap analysis and recommendations; (6) hazardous wastes and substances under the Basel Convention that are relevant to ship dismantling; and (7) information sources relevant to ship dismantling.

For further information, refer to the following UNEP/Basel Convention Internet Web Site: http://www.basel.int/cop6/cop6_23e.pdf.

C. Strategic Plan for Homeland Security (EPA)

On October 2, 2002, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) announced the availability of its Strategic Plan for Homeland Security. EPA's traditional mission has expanded to include protecting the nation against the environmental and health consequences of acts of terrorism. EPA has the important responsibility of helping to secure the nation's drinking and wastewater infrastructure, of promoting security of the U.S. chemical industry and hazardous materials sector, and of responding to and recovering from acts of biological, chemical, certain radiological, and other terrorist attacks. Dated September 2002, the Strategic Plan reflects the responsibilities assigned to EPA in President Bush's National Strategy for Homeland Security and in the President's legislative proposal for the creation of a new Department of Homeland Security. The activities and initiatives in the plan represent an enhancement of EPA's capabilities to detect, prepare for, prevent, respond to, and recover from terrorist incidents.

The goals of this Strategic Plan are organized into four mission-critical areas: (1) critical infrastructure protection; (2) preparedness, response, and recovery; (3) communication and information; and (4) protection of EPA personnel and infrastructure. EPA has developed specific tactics to accomplish each goal and, for many goals, detailed activity lists and time frames for their completion. For almost every tactic, a key initial activity will be coordinated with participation from the new Department of Homeland Security, other federal agencies, and EPA's partners at the state, local, and tribal levels.

Critical Infrastructure Protection: EPA has unique programmatic responsibilities and expertise related to the water and wastewater industries; the use, handling, storage, release, and disposal of chemicals and chemical wastes at industrial facilities; and indoor air quality. In these areas, EPA

is committed to assessing and reducing vulnerabilities and strengthening detection and response capabilities for critical infrastructures. In addition, EPA will contribute to similar efforts led by other federal agencies addressing food, transportation, and energy industries, and will provide environmental expertise to support federal law enforcement activities.

Preparedness, Response, and Recovery: Under the National Strategy for Homeland Security and various federal response plans, EPA has specific response and recovery responsibilities. For example, EPA personnel were active in New York City, providing air monitoring at the World Trade Center site shortly after September 11. Other EPA staff had a principal role in carrying out the decontamination of anthrax from federal office buildings. These experiences made clear that enhancements in EPA's response and recovery capabilities were necessary. Under this goal, EPA will focus on strengthening and broadening its response capabilities, clarifying its roles and responsibilities to ensure an effective response, and promoting improved response capabilities across government and industry in the areas in which EPA has unique knowledge and expertise. Among goals in this area are the development, dissemination, and exercising of new and improved tools and techniques for responding to chemical, biological, and radiological incidents.

Communication and Information: Comprehensive, accurate, well-organized, and timely information is critical to sound decision making. EPA possesses unique capabilities to collect, synthesize, interpret, manage, disseminate, and provide understanding to complex information about environmental and human-made contaminants and the condition of the environment. Effectively managing and sharing this information within EPA and with its partners at all levels of government and industry will contribute to the nation's capability to detect, prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist incidents.

Protection of EPA Personnel and Infrastructure: The security and protection of its own personnel and infrastructure are critical to ensuring EPA's ability to respond to terrorist incidents as well as continue to fulfill its mission. In recognition of this, EPA will undertake steps to safeguard its staff, ensure the continuity of its operations, and protect the operational capability of its vital infrastructure assets.

For further information, contact Ms. Linda Fisher, Deputy Administrator, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20460, (telephone: (202) 564-4711, electronic mail: fisher.linda@epa.gov). A copy of the Strategic Plan can be accessed on the following EPA Internet Web Site: http://www.epa.gov/epahome/downloads/epa_homeland_security_strategic_plan.pdf.

D. Invasive Species (GAO)

The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) has published a report (GAO-03-1) dated October 2002 and titled *Invasive Species: Clearer Focus and Greater Commitment Needed to Effectively Manage the Problem*. Invasive species – harmful, nonnative plants, animals, and microorganisms – are found throughout the United States, causing damage to crops, rangelands, waterways, and other ecosystems that is estimated in the billions of dollars annually. Some have termed invasive species “biological pollutants.” Unlike some chemical pollutants that can

degrade over time, biological pollutants have the potential to persist, multiply, and spread. In addition to their economic costs, invasive species can have a devastating effect on natural areas, where they have strangled native plants, taken over wetland habitats, crowded out native species, and deprived waterfowl and other species of food sources. In 2001, the federal government issued a National Invasive Species Management Plan to focus attention on invasive species and to coordinate a national control effort involving the 20 or so federal agencies that are responsible for managing them.

The objectives of the GAO review that led to this report were to: (1) assess the usefulness of analyses that have estimated the economic impact of invasive species in the United States to federal decision-makers responsible for preventing and controlling their spread; (2) assess the National Invasive Species Management Plan, including the extent to which the plan has been implemented; (3) provide the views of experts on the adequacy of U.S. and Canadian federal government efforts to prevent the introduction of invasive species into the Great Lakes via ballast water of ships; and (4) describe how the United States and Canada are coordinating invasive species management efforts.

Among the findings and recommendations in the report are the following:

1. Existing literature on the economic impacts of invasive species is of limited usefulness to decision-makers, although it indicates that the effects of invasive species are significant. Most economic estimates do not consider all of the relevant effects of nonnative species or the future risks that they pose. New initiatives may prompt more comprehensive analysis that could help decision-makers make better resource allocations.
2. While the National Invasive Species Management Plan calls for many actions that are likely to contribute to preventing and controlling invasive species in the United States, it does not clearly articulate specific long-term goals toward which the government should strive. In addition, the federal government has made little progress in implementing the actions called for by the plan.
3. Even with high levels of compliance, U.S. regulations have not eliminated the introduction of invasive species into the Great Lakes via the ballast water of ships. The United States and Canada are working on strengthening the existing control system, but developing stronger regulations and the technology needed to meet them will take many years. The continued introduction of invasive species could have high economic and ecological costs for the Great Lakes.
4. GAO recommends that the National Invasive Species Council, which was established by Executive Order 13112, take following actions: (a) incorporate data on the economic impacts of invasive species in developing the federal government's budget; (b) add performance-oriented goals and objectives to its updated plan; (c) give high priority to an oversight strategy for measuring progress against results-oriented goals; and (d) examine whether the Council is being hampered in its implementation of the plan by the lack of specific legislation.

For further information, contact Mr. David Wood, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, U.S. General Accounting Office, 441 G Street, NW, Washington, DC 20548, (telephone: (202) 512-6878, electronic mail: woodd@gao.gov. To view the full report, refer to the following GAO Internet Web Link: <http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?gao-03-01>.

E. Homeland Security Imperatives (CFR)

During October 2002, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) published the report of its Independent Task Force on Homeland Security Imperatives titled *America Still Unprepared – America Still in Danger*. According to the Task Force in their report, attacks against Americans on U.S. soil that may involve weapons of mass destruction are likely, but the structures and strategies to respond to this serious threat are fragmented and inadequate. The Task Force recognizes that important and generally salutary measures have been undertaken since September 11, 2001, to respond to the risk of catastrophic terrorism, including pending legislation to create a Department of Homeland Security, which should be enacted on an urgent basis. Yet, there is still cause for concern. After a year without a new attack, there are already signs that Americans are lapsing back into complacency. Also, a war with Iraq could consume virtually all the nation's attention and command the bulk of the available resources. President Bush has declared that combating terrorism requires a war on two fronts – at home and abroad. The Task Force believes the nation should respond accordingly. It outlines a number of homeland security priorities that should be pursued with the same sense of urgency and national purpose as U.S. overseas exertions.

Key recommendations of the Task Force on Homeland Security are as follows:

1. Empower front-line agents to intercept terrorists by establishing a 24-hour operations center in each state that can provide access to terrorist watch list information via real time intergovernmental links between local and federal law enforcement.
2. Make first responders ready to respond by immediately providing federal funds to clear the backlog of requests for protective gear, training, and communications equipment. State and local budgets cannot bankroll these necessities in the near term.
3. Recalibrate the agenda for transportation security; the vulnerabilities are greater and the stakes are higher in the sea and land modes than in commercial aviation. Systems such as those used in the aviation sector, which start from the assumption that every passenger and every bag of luggage poses an equal risk, must give way to more intelligence-driven and layered security approaches that emphasize prescreening and monitoring based on risk-criteria.
4. Fund energy distribution vulnerability assessments to be completed in no more than 6 months, fund a stockpile of modular backup components to quickly restore the operation of the energy grid should it be targeted, and work with Canada to put in place adequate security measures for bi-national pipelines.

5. Strengthen the capacity of local, state, and federal public health and agricultural agencies to detect and conduct disease outbreak investigations. The key to mitigating casualties associated with a biological attack against people or the food supply is to identify the source of infection as early as possible.
6. Enact an “Omnibus Anti-Red Tape” law with a 2-year sunset clause for approved private-public homeland security task forces to include: (a) a fast-track security clearance process that permits the sharing of “secret-level” classified information with non-federal and industry leaders; (b) a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) exemption in instances when critical infrastructure industry leaders agree to share information about their security vulnerabilities with federal agencies; (c) an exemption of private participants in these task forces from antitrust rules; (d) homeland security appropriations to be managed under the more liberal rules governing research and development programs in the Department of Defense rather than the normal Federal Acquisition Rules; and (e) liability safeguards and limits.
7. Fund, equip, and train National Guard units around the country to ensure they can support the new state homeland security plans under development by each governor. Also, triple the number of National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Support Teams from 22 to 66.

Quickly mobilizing the nation to prepare for the worst is an act of prudence, not fatalism. In the 21st century, security and liberty are inseparable. The absence of adequate security elevates the risk that laws will be passed immediately in the wake of surprise terrorist attacks that will be reactive, not deliberative. Predictably, the consequence will be to compound the initial harm incurred by a tragic event with measures that overreach in terms of imposing costly new security mandates and with the assumption of new government authorities that may erode U.S. freedoms. Accordingly, aggressively pursuing America’s homeland security imperatives quickly and immediately may well be the most important thing that can be done to sustain America’s cherished freedoms for future generations.

Preparedness at home plays a critical role in combating terrorism by reducing its appeal as an effective means of warfare. Acts of catastrophic terrorism produce not only deaths and physical destruction but also societal and economic disruption. Thus, as important as it is to try and attack terrorist organizations overseas and isolate those who support them, it is equally important to eliminate the incentive for undertaking these acts in the first place. By sharply reducing, if not eliminating, the disruptive effects of terrorism, America’s adversaries may be deterred from taking their battles to the streets of the American homeland.

For further information, contact the Director of Communications, Council on Foreign Relations, 58 East 68th Street, New York, NY 10021, (telephone: (212) 434-9400), or visit the Council’s Internet Web Site: <http://www.cfr.org>.

F. Secure Trade in the APEC Region (White House)

On October 26, 2002, President George W. Bush, together with other Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders, launched the Secure Trade in the APEC Region (STAR) initiative,

which is designed to enhance security while increasing trade. The STAR initiative commits APEC economies to accelerate action on screening people and cargo for security before transit; increasing security on ships and airplanes while en route; and enhancing security in airports and seaports. This initiative complements the transport security initiative that President Bush secured at the G-8 Kananaskis Summit in June 2002, as well as smart border programs that the President has launched with Mexico and Canada, and advances a vision of security that pushes the perimeter beyond the physical border. A number of APEC economies, encompassing most of the biggest ports in the region, have also agreed to participate in the U.S. Customs Service Container Security Initiative (CSI).

The challenge is to promote the efficient and reliable movement of people and goods across borders, while preventing the tools of transport from becoming tools of terrorism. APEC countries account for over 50 percent of the world's trade, 21 of the world's 30 top container seaports, and 23 of the world's 30 busiest airports. Globally, over 48 million cargo containers move between major seaports annually. Each year, more than 16 million containers arrive in the United States by ship, truck, and rail. More than 14,000 planes are flying in the global fleet of commercial airlines.

The United States proposed earlier this year that APEC address this challenge by advancing secure trade initiatives. APEC has agreed and committed to a plan of action that will:

1. Protect cargo by: (a) identifying and examining high-risk containers, assuring in-transit integrity, and providing advance electronic information on containers to customs, port, and shipping officials as early as possible in the supply chain; (b) implementing by 2005 common standards for electronic customs reporting; and (c) promoting private-sector adoption of high standards of supply chain security.
2. Protect ships by: (a) promoting ship and port security plans by July 2004 and installing automatic identification systems on certain ships by December 2004; and (b) cooperating to fight piracy in the region.
3. Protect international aviation by: (a) introducing new baggage screening procedures and equipment in all APEC major airports by 2005; (b) reinforcing flight deck doors for passenger aircraft by April 2003; and (c) supporting International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) mandatory aviation security audits.
4. Protect people in transit by: (a) implementing a common global standard on advance passenger information; (b) adopting biometrics standards, such as those being developed by ICAO and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO); (c) reforming immigration service procedures; and (d) promoting adoption of air cargo security guidelines developed by ICAO and the International Air Transport Association (IATA).

For further information, refer to the White House Internet Web Site: <http://www.whitehouse.gov>. APEC was established in 1989 in response to the growing interdependence among Asia-Pacific economies and has become the primary regional vehicle for promoting open trade and practical economic cooperation.

G. Security Guidelines for Vessels (CG)

The Coast Guard (CG), U.S. Department of Transportation, has published a Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular (NVIC) dated October 21, 2002, and titled *Security Guidelines for Vessels*. NVIC 10 02 establishes new guidelines for performing security assessments, developing security plans, and implementing security measures and procedures. Captains of the Port (COTPs) are encouraged to bring this circular to the attention of marine interests within their respective zones of responsibility. All vessel operators and owners are encouraged to consider the guidance provided in this NVIC. This circular has been developed to assist vessel operators and owners to align with the security requirements being developed at the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and to reflect good security practices for all vessels.

Commercial vessels provide a target of opportunity for those desiring to harm the interests of the United States. Owners and operators of vessels have the primary responsibility for ensuring the physical security and safety of their vessels. Therefore, these guidelines are a means of promoting industry practices to advance U.S. vital national security interests. The guidelines do not relieve owners and operators of their legal responsibilities but help them to meet their responsibilities to provide safe and secure transportation for their passengers and cargo. Although the intent is to promote uniform practices and procedures, the guidelines were also developed with the understanding that threat levels or particular circumstances differ among various geographic areas or ports based upon the risks present. When necessary, COTPs should exercise discretion and flexibility in determining which guidelines are appropriate for a given threat level or the unique circumstances within their zone of responsibility.

It is anticipated that the IMO will finalize maritime security amendments to chapter XI of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS Convention) and a new mandatory International Ship and Port Facility (ISPS) Code in December 2002. The ISPS Code will also contain a recommendatory part that provides guidance for implementation of the mandatory requirements. Security measures, initiatives, and procedures discussed in this circular and addressed in a Vessel Security Plan will also be used to satisfy evolving international vessel security requirements for ships on international voyages.

For a copy of NVIC 10 02 and copies of other NVICs dealing with marine safety, security, and environmental protection, refer to the following Coast Guard Internet Web Site:

<http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-m/nvic/index00.htm>.

H. State Government Role in Climate Change (Pew Center)

The Pew Center on Global Climate Change has published a report dated November 2002 and titled *Greenhouse and Statehouse: The Evolving State Government Role in Climate Change*. According to this report, U.S. states have been formulating climate change policy for more than a decade, although their efforts have expanded and intensified in the past several years. In some cases, states have considered climate change mitigation explicitly while in others it has been an incidental benefit. Reflective of the vast scope of activity that generates greenhouse gases (GHGs), state policies have been enacted that reduce these emissions in such areas as promotion

of renewable energy, air pollution control, agriculture and forestry, waste management, transportation, and energy development, among others. In almost all cases, there have been multiple drivers behind and multiple benefits from these state policies.

Much of this report is devoted to an examination of leading examples of innovation in various sectors, from renewable energy efforts in Texas to a cross-cutting approach in New Jersey. Nine case studies are presented in particular depth, followed by supplemental cases where appropriate. These cases tend to vary markedly from one another in detail and yet are linked by common design characteristics. First, they tend to have been supported through broad, bipartisan coalitions that received significant support from diverse stakeholders. State climate change policies have been signed into law by Governors who are Democrats, Republicans, and Independents. Second, they have been viewed as an economic development opportunity. State policies have been crafted to foster long-term economic well-being, which has contributed to their broad base of support. Third, they reflect abundant state-level opportunities for innovation and policy entrepreneurship, often involving state officials who build coalitions around a particular idea for new policy.

When viewed as a collection of efforts, these initiatives outline possible elements of a long-term climate change strategy for the United States. Diffusion of innovation from one state to others is already occurring, and clusters of contiguous states are beginning to consider cooperative efforts. Some of these policies may also serve as models that warrant emulation by the federal government in developing a more comprehensive strategy for the nation. This is entirely consistent with the long-standing tradition in U.S. governance whereby states serve as laboratories for subsequent federal policy. In turn, the vigorous and creative nature of state innovation in this area suggests that any future federal policy initiatives on global climate change consider carefully the significant roles that state governments may be able to play in achieving long-term reduction of GHGs.

For further information, contact Ms. Katie Mandes, Pew Center on Global Climate Change, 2101 Wilson Boulevard, Suite 550, Arlington, VA 22201, (telephone: (703) 516-4146), or refer to the following Pew Center Internet Web Site: http://pewclimate.org/projects/index_solutions.cfm.

I. Container Security (GAO)

On November 18, 2002, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) released a report (GAO-03-297T) titled *Container Security: Current Efforts to Detect Nuclear Materials, New Initiatives, and Challenges*. Security risks related to U.S. ports are clearly serious ones that pose national security concerns. This report focuses on: (1) the programs in place to prevent illegal fissile material or a tactical nuclear weapon from being smuggled into the United States through its ports; (2) new efforts under way to counter such smuggling, both domestically and abroad; and (3) the key challenges faced in implementing these various efforts.

GAO has found that the programs already in place at U.S. ports for detecting illegal fissile material or nuclear weapons are limited in a number of respects. They focus on screening a small portion of total cargo as it enters U.S. ports, and they are carried out without the use of

adequate detection aids, such as radiation-detection equipment that can scan the entire contents of cargo containers. Instead, Customs Service personnel rely on small, handheld radiation pagers that have a limited range and capability. Other screening programs designed more broadly to identify any illegal or hazardous cargoes could potentially help identify such nuclear material as well, but these programs rely heavily on the availability of quality information for targeting those cargoes posing the greatest risk. The Customs Service acknowledges that the accuracy of such information still needs improvement.

The predominant focus of most new initiatives has been to establish additional lines of security in the supply chain of international commerce. In essence, this means moving part of the effort overseas, where goods are prepared for shipment into this country. These initiatives include such efforts as establishing international standards for ports, carriers, and maritime workers; stationing Customs personnel overseas to identify high-risk containers before inspection in foreign ports; reducing security vulnerabilities along the overseas portion of the supply chain; and using new technology to monitor the contents and movement of containers from their points of origin. Because the United States functions in a global economy where international organizations are addressing similar issues, current U.S.-led efforts are evolving within that context.

The United States faces considerable challenges to successfully implement these existing and new efforts, both at home and abroad. GAO reviews of port security programs have shown that, even on the domestic front, the federal government faces challenges in creating and enforcing a set of security standards, ensuring the cooperation of diverse groups with competing interests when it comes to specifics of how things are to be done, and paying the increased security bill. These same challenges are likely to exist in efforts to extend strong measures of security elsewhere. To make its programs work, the United States is participating in and seeking to achieve consensus through a variety of international organizations across many nations (e.g., the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the World Customs Organization (WCO), the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), the International Labor Organization (ILO), and the United Nations Committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods).

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J. Operation Safe Commerce (TSA)

On November 20, 2002, (67 FR 70110), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), working in conjunction with the Executive Steering Committee (ESC) for Operation Safe Commerce (OSC), announced a program to identify and fund business driven initiatives to enhance security for the movement of cargo through the supply chain. The Ports of Los Angeles, Long Beach, Seattle, and Tacoma, and the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey will be invited to submit proposals for funding consideration under this initiative. Persons and entities representing components of the supply chain may seek funding through these ports.

The goal of OSC is to explore commercially viable options that support cargo management systems that keep pace with expanding trade while protecting commercial shipments from threats of terrorist attack, illegal immigration, illegal drugs, and other contraband. OSC will address three key components to secure the supply chain through pilot projects funded by TSA. OSC will demonstrate what is needed to ensure that parties associated with commercial shipping exert reasonable care and due diligence in packing, securing, and manifesting the contents of a shipment of goods in a container. OSC will also demonstrate various methods to ensure that the information and documentation associated with these shipments is complete, accurate, and secure from unauthorized access. These methods may entail transmitting the associated shipping information and documentation in a secure electronic format. OSC will also test supply chain security procedures and practices in order to determine the impact of these procedures when combined with the implementation of enhanced manifest data elements and container sealing procedures (including effective intrusion detection). The ESC will examine the three components to determine the most effective method to lessen the susceptibility of a container shipment to being compromised while in transit in the international or domestic supply chain.

For further information, contact Mr. Walter (Bud) Hunt, Office of Maritime and Land Security, Transportation Security Administration, 400 Seventh Street, SW, Washington, DC 20590, (telephone: (202) 772-1045, electronic mail: walterbud.hunt@tsa.dot.gov).